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CRIMINAL LAW AT THE INTERNATIONAL
BORDER
Joseph A. Milchen*
Sound policy considerations support the special
treatment accorded border searches. Congress as well as
the courts have thus recognized the peculiar and difficult
law enforcement problems that necessarily are presented
by the effective policing of our extensive national
boundaries.'
The extensiveness of our national boundaries is indeed
impressive. Of the forty-eight states in the continental United
States, thirty-one are located with some portion of their external
boundary forming the international border of the United States.'
Of course, both of the non-contiguous states, Alaska and Hawaii,
are completely surrounded by territory foreign to the United
States. Additionally, it should be noted that all of the territories of
the United States, to which the criminal jurisdiction of the federal
government extends,3 are likewise only accessible from areas
outside the jurisdiction of the United States.
These geographical considerations are set forth to indicate the
potential scope of 1dgal problems that might arise at an
international border. The mere length of the border permits
imaginative speculation regarding possible violations of customs
laws.
Modern means of communication and travel intensify the
situation. People are simply better equipped to cross the border.
The projected figure for border crossings in 1968 is over 213 million
*Assistant United States Attorney for the Southern District of California; Member,
State Bar of California. J.D., University of Michigan Law School, 1965. The views
expressed in this article are to be attributed to the author and not to the United States
Department of Justice.
I. King v. United States, 348 F.2d 814, 818 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 926
(1965).
2. Fourteen states form the eastern seaboard of the country, five states are along the
Gulf of Mexico, four states border the Republic of Mexico, three states comprise the West
Coast, and thirteen states constitute the northern boundary with Canada. The ratio of states
along some international boundary to those which are not is almost two to one.
3. "The term 'United States', as used in this title in a territorial sense, includes all
places and waters, continental or insular, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,
except the Canal Zone." 18 U.S.C. § 5 (1964).
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entries. 4 This figure is startling when constrasted with the smaller
number, 200 millions, of people residing within the United States.
The boundary is impressively long and the traffic is much greater
than most people realize. These factors become the subject of in-
tense concern when related to the immense amount of contraband,
particularly narcotics, which is brought into the United States.'
For the most part, narcotics and marihuana do not originate
locally within the United States. Dangerous drugs, although
manufactured within the United States, generally are accessible
without justifiable reason only outside the country. The illegal
traffic in these items invariably involves criminal importation into
this country. Because the prime consequences of illegal importation
involve criminal repercussions, the border law which had developed
has arisen in the context of a criminal case.
Although some aspects of the law applicable at the
international border are well settled, neither legislative insight, nor
fertile imagination nor past experience provide sufficient perception
to cover the myriad situations that can arise at the border.
Furthermore, new developments in related fields must be examined
insofar as the border crossing situation may affect or be affected by
them. As a result, there are the following areas of interest:
(1) the nature of the fourth amendment prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures in its application to the
border;
(2) the subsequent importation, without declaration, of
contraband taken from the United States into a foreign country;
(3) the applicability of the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination to the proscriptions against illegal
importation and to the statutory presumptions;
(4)* the introduction of contraband into the United States with
the consent and knowledge of governmental agents;
(5) the disclosure of the identity of the border informer, and
the procedure to be followed in determining this issue;
(6) the admissibility of responses to interrogatories during
temporary detention by governmental officials at the border;
and
(7) the nature of "intent" required by each illegal importation
statute, and the possibility of overlapping application of the
statutes.
4. This projection is based on a similar percentage increase of border entries computed
during the fiscal year 1967. 1967 Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury (Table 85).
5. 1967 Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury (Table 90).
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I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AT THE BORDER
It has always been quite evident that the stoppings, searches
and seizures at an international border are to be considered in a
different light from those conducted internally in the United States.
When the Supreme Court announced its initial major expositions
on the fourth amendment, the border situation received
consideration. In Boyd v. United States,6 the Court noted:
The search for and seizure of . . goods liable to duties and
concealed to avoid the payment thereof, are totally different
things from a search for.and seizure of a man's private books
and papers for the purpose of obtaining information therein
contained, or of using them as evidence against him. The two
things differ toto coel. 7
Again, in Carroll v. United States,' the Court states that
"[tiravellers may be . .. stopped in crossing an international
boundary because of national self protection reasonably requiring
one entering the country to identify himself as entitled to come in,
and his belongings as effects which may be lawfully brought in." 9
Citing this language from Boyd and Carroll as a basis, courts
have recognized that at the border "different rules of law are
applicable."' "A search of persons entering the United States
from a foreign country is in a separate category from searches
generally."" The search conducted at the border by customs
officials is "of the broadest possible character and any evidence
received might be used."'' 2 The right of privacy of those crossing the
international boundary is restricted, 3 and a certain invasion of
privacy is justified by the mere fact of international travel.1 4 The
uniqueness of the border situation is reiterated frequently.' 5
6. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
7. Id. at 623.
8. 267 U.S. 132 (1924).
9. Id. at 154.
10. Witt v. United States, 287 F.2d 389, 391 (9th Cir. 1961).
1I. Denton v. United States, 310 F.2d 129, 131 (9th Cir. 1962).
12. Landau v. United States Attorney, 82 F.2d 285, 286 (2d Cir. 1936). See also, e.g.,
United States v. Rodriguez, 195 F. Supp. 513 (S.D. Tex. 1960), affd 292 F.2d 709 (5th Cir.
1961).
13. Landau v. United States Attorney, 82 F.2d at 286.
14. Deck v. United States, 395 F.2d 89, 90(9th Cir. 1968).
15. See, e.g., Thomas v. United States, 372 F.2d 252, 254 (5th Cir. 1967); Witt v.
United States, 287 F.2d at 391; United States v. Yee Ngee How, 105 F. Supp. 517, 519
(N.D. Cal. 1952). See also Decca v. United States, 346 F.2d 158 (5th Cir. 1965); United
States v. Massiah, 307 F.2d 62, 67 (2d Cir. 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 377 U.S. 201
1"9691
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National self-protection and collection of duties orovide the
compelling rationale for treating the requirements of the fourth
amendment in a different light at the border. 6 "[A] search which
would be 'unreasonable' within the meaning of the fourth
amendment, if conducted by police officers in the ordinary case,
would be a reasonable search if conducted by Customs officials."' 7
This is not to say that the fourth amendment has no application at
the border. Although it might be argued that there is no limit to the
extent of a search of a person and his belongings at the border (the
unlimited search being the only means to insure adequately that
goods subject to duty do not escape detection or that the national
self-interest is secured), it has been held that a border search is not
exempt from the constitutional test of reasonableness. 8
Undoubtedly a systematic and arbitrary method of search,
such as searching every tenth car or only Negroes, would run afoul
of constitutional requirements. However, the mere fact that all
persons are not subjected to the same type of search at a border
does not prevent a more thorough search of one person."
Furthermore an initial cursory search by governmental officials
does not preclude a subsequent, more thorough search by the same
agency" or another." The momentary escape from detection does
not immunize the traveller against further interrogation and
(1964); Hoxie v. United States, 15 F.2d 762 (9th Cir. 1926); United States v. McGlone, 266
F. Supp. 673 (E.D. Va. 1967). Cf. General Motor Acceptance Corp. v. United States, 286
U.S. 49, 56 (1932) (where the Court upheld forfeiture of vehicles carrying contraband as
"one of the time-honored methods adopted by the Government for the repression of the
crime of smuggling").
16. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. at 138-39. See also Thomas v. United States, 372
F.2d at 254.
17. Alexander v. United States, 362 F.2d 379, 381 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 977
(1966).
18. Thomas v. United States, 372 F.2d at 254; Marsh v. United States, 344 F.2d 317,
324 (5th Cir. 1965); Patenotte v. United States, 266 F.2d 647 (5th Cir. 1959).
19. Witt v. United States, 287 F.2d at 391.
20. Morales v. United States, 378 F.2d 187, 190 (5th Cir. 1967) (initial and subsequent
searches by customs officials). See alsb Fernandez v. United States, 321 F.2d 283, 286 n.4
(9th Cir. 1963). In United States v. Yee Ngee How, 105 F. Supp. 517 (N.D. Cal. 1952), a
search of a seaman who disembarked was not precluded by a search the previous day when he
went ashore. The situation was viewed much in the same manner as that of a person leaving
the country and desiring to enter. Id. at 521.
21. Rivera v. United States, 327 F.2d 791 (lst Cir. 1964) (initial search by immigration
officers and second one by customs officials).
22. Thomas v. United States, 372 F.2d at 255; United States v. Rodriguez, 195 F.
Supp. at 516.
23. Taylor v. United States, 352 F.2d 328 (9th Cir. 1965).
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examination,22 particularly where the traveller evades the initial
examination by his own deception. 3
The border is elastic. 24 A border search is not confined to the
port of entry. Thus, searches have been sustained as border searches
between the gangway of a ship and the pier gate which opened out
onto the public streets of a city,25 850 feet from the border with a
closeness in time,26 five blocks away and 25 minutes after entry,27
six blocks and one and one-half hours in an urban area,28 14
miles, 29 20 miles,3" and even 75 miles.3 ' However, a search some 63
miles from the border, with no discussion of the time element, and
not predicated on probable cause,32 was held to be unreasonable.
Even if a search cannot be sustained as a border search per se,
the mere fact that the activities occur in close proximity to the
border increases the likelihood of finding that the search was based
upon probable cause. The same activities by an individual may
seem much more incriminating near the border than if committed
elsewhere.3
Distance and time become relative factors when the test of a
border search is "a determination [of] whether the totality of the
surrounding circumstances, including the time and distance elapsed
as well as the manner and extent of surveillance [from time of entry
by governmental agents], are such as to convince the fact finder
with reasonable certainty ' 3 4 that the person or vehicle is in the same
condition as when the border was crossed." Even if searches occur
24. Marsh v. United States, 344 F.2d at 324.
25. United States v. Yee Ngee How, 105 F. Supp. 517.
26. Taylor v. United States, 352 F.2d at 329.
27. Valadez v. United States, 358 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1966).
28. Thomas v. United States, 372 F.2d at 255.
29. Haerr v. United States, 240 F.2d 533 (5th Cir. 1957). See also Flores v. United
States, 234 F.2d 604 (5th Cir. 1956).
30. United States v. Rodriguez, 195 F. Supp. at 513.
3 1. Ramirez v. United States, 263 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1959). This search was justified as
a border search. It probably could have been better justified as a valid immigration search.
See text accompanying note 41 infra.
32. Marsh v. United States, 344 F.2d at 324-25.
33. Thus, the search of the bags to be shipped by train in a border city was held
justified, the court taking judicial notice that the city, El Paso, Texas, was a great source of
narcotics cases. Romerov. United States, 318 F.2d 530 n.1 (5th Cir. 1963). ButseeCorngold
v. United States, 367 F.2d I (9th Cir. 1966). In Mansfield v. United States, discarding an
item and retrieving it after entry into the public streets by a crewman also justified a search.
308 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1962).
34. Alexander v. United States, 362 F.2d at 382.
35. Rodriguez-Gonzalez v. United States, 378 F.2d 256 (9th Cir. 1967); Alexander v.
United States, 362 F.2d at 382-83; King v. United States, 348 F.2d at 816.
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some distance from the border, such as 636 or 15 miles,37 the search
is valid. The fact that the person or vehicle is temporarily out of
sight does not alter the character of a border search.39
A "wetback" search conducted by immigration officers at a
distance from the border often appears to be a border search. These
searches are conducted by immigration officers pursuant to their
authority to make searches for immigration violations within a
reasonable distance (up to 100 miles) of the external boundary of
the United States." Frequently during such searches illegally
imported contraband is discovered. Although not a border search
as such,4' if the discovery is reasonably related and incident to a
search for immigration purposes, it is valid. However, the evidence
may be seized in a manner inconsistent with any immigration
purpose. Thus, searching a cigarette package, containing
marihuana, unsupported by probable cause, could not be sustained
because of the unlikelihood of finding an alien concealed therein.42
Frequently, in the course of such a search, probable cause will
develop. For example, if in searching for aliens an immigration
officer sees an open package of marihuana, or upon opening the
trunk of a car smells an odor which he recognized as that of
marihuana, probable cause exists.43
At the border, probable cause is not the standard by which the
reasonableness of the search is tested; mere suspicion has been held
to justify such a search.44 Additionally, neither a warrant nor an
36. Willis v. United States, 370 F.2d 604 (5th Cir. 1966).
37. Leeks v. United States, 356 F.2d 470, 471 (9th Cir. 1966).
38. Ng Pui Yu v. United States, 352 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1965). But see Plazola v. United
States, 291 F.2d 56 (9th Cir. 1961).
39. Alexander v. United States, 362 F.2d at 382-83; Leeks v. United States, 356 F.2d at
470.
40. An immigration officer may search any vehicle for aliens within a reasonable
distance from any external boundary of the United States for the purpose of patrolling the
border to prevent the illegal entry of aliens into the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3)
([964). "Reasonable distance" is defined to be up to 100 air miles. 8 C.F.R. § 287.1 (1967).
41. Normally these searches occur at regularly maintained immigration checkpoints.
Barba-Reyes v. United States, 387 F.2d 91 (9th Cir. 1967) (about 70 miles from the border);
Renteria-Medina v. United States, 346 F.2d 853 (9th Cir. 1965); Fernandez v. United States,
321 F.2d at 283. But see Cervantes v. United States, 263 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1959) (where only
probable cause was discussed and found lacking, without a discussion of the validity of the
search as an immigration search); Contreras v. United States, 291 F.2d 63 (9th Cir. 1961)
(where the search could not justifiably relate to immigration matters).
42. United States v. Hortze, 179 F. Supp. 913 (S.D. Cal. 1959).
43. Id. at 917-18.
44. E.g., Thomas v. United States, 372 F.2d at 254. There is authority for the
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arrest is needed to search.4" As a practical matter, this requirement
of mere suspicion may be no requirement at all. It is too simple a
standard to reduce to factual certainty. For example, to support a
mere suspicion, an inspector would only have to allege that the
individual was "nervous. '4 6 Nervousness, although a condition
difficult to translate into actual physical symptoms, is very real and
detectable. It is difficult to imagine an instance where the initial
stopping could not be adequately and legally sustained by merely
alleging that the individual was nervous.
When mere suspicion does exist, it justifies only a limited search
of the individual's person and belongings. 7 Similarly a search of a
vehicle or an external search of a person may be based on mere
suspicion. Any further search of an individual's person obviously
involves a more significant intrusion upon his privacy. Thus, a
"strip search," one involving the removal of a person's clothes for a
thorough search of the clothing and an external visual inspection of
one's body, must be based on something more substantial than
mere suspicion, but still less than probable cause." The verbal
formula has been set as a "real suspicion, directed specifically to
that person . . ."I'
A search of one's stomach or body cavities has been held to be
justified where there is a "clear indication" or "plain suggestion"
that contraband may be located in that place." Mere chance that
contraband will be discovered beyond the body surface does not
suffice to meet the test." All of these verbal formulas still fall short
of the classical legal test of probable cause for a search. 2
proposition that even mere suspicion is not needed for a detention for a limited search.
Henderson v. United States, 390 F.2d 805, 808 (9th Cir. 1967). "[T]here is reason and
probable cause to search every person entering the United States from a foreign country, by
reason of such entry alone." Witt v. United States, 287 F.2d at 391. This conflicting
language can be resolved internally. Witts "probable cause" is only for a restricted type of
search, and does not a.pply to more intrusive searches. Henderson's lack of "mere suspicion"
only relates to the initial detention, not to the more intrusive inquiries.
45. Landau v. United States Attorney, 82 F.2d at 286.
46. See Bible v. United States, 314 F.2d 106 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 862
(1963).
47. Henderson v. United States, 390 F.2d at 808; Bible v. United States, 314 F.2d 106.
48. Witt v. United States, 287 F.2d at 391-92.
49. Henderson v. United States, 390 F.2d at 808.
50. Id. at 806; Rivas v. United States, 368 F.2d 703, 710 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 945 (1967).
51. Henderson v. United States, 390 F.2d at 808.
52. Rivas v. United States, 368 F.2d at 710.
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The vagaries of the legal standards permit considerable
flexibility in the factual findings of a trial or appellate court. If the
court is inclined toward a certain result, the process becomes a
matter of construing the facts to support the desired result. It is not
surprising to discover that such intrusions, patently offensive by
their very nature, have been recently rejected and convictions have
been reversed on a factual basis,3 even though some question exists
of whether the record below supports the factual findings of the
appellate court." What may be reflected by these apparent factual
distortions is a growing opinion that such intrusive searches should
be attended by a search warrant." Such a factual approach fills the
void left by present statutory and judicial law. However, such an
approach, seemingly without adequate foundation, causes
consternation to those parties critical of the integrity of the fact
finding process of the courts.
In spite of the procedure whereby the results were reached,
there may be good reason to shift the responsibility of deciding
whether the facts present a valid justification for a body cavity
search. Currently the decision rests with customs officials, whose
concern is directed to discovering contraband, thereby perhaps
obscuring their perception into the significance of the facts present.
53. Henderson v. United States, 390 F.2d at 805; Huguez v. United States, .F.2d
_(9th Cir. 1968). In Huguez, a fifth amendment "due process" contention, as well as a
fourth amendment "unreasonableness of the search" argument, based on the same facts,
resulted in a reversal of the conviction.
54. Henderson v. United States, 390 F.2d at 811-12 (dissenting opinion); Huguez v.
United States, -F.2d at - (dissenting opinion).
55. This opinion was first set forth in Blefare v. United States, 362 F.2d 870, 887 (9th
Cir. 1966) (dissenting opinion). In support of Judge Ely's position post-Blefare are Border
Searches and the Fourth Amendment, 77 Yale L.J. 1007 (1968); Note, Border
Searches.-Extractions From Body, 18 W. Res. L. Rev. 1007 (1967); Note, Search and
Seizure at the Border-The Border Search, 21 Rutgers L. Rev. 513 (1967); Comment, The
Reasonableness of Border Searches, 4 Cal. W. L. Rev. 355 (1968); Comment, Stomach
Pumping Incident to Border Search Held Not an Unreasonable Search and Seizure, 19 Fla.
L. Rev. 374 (1966); Comment, Intrusive Border Searches-Is Judicial Control Desirable?,
115 U. Pa. L. Rev. 276 (1966). In Huguez v. United States, - F.2d at -. The issue
was avoided thusly:
We have considered but do not discuss the question of whether the doctor and
the law enforcement officers here in Huguez should have, because of the absence
of any emergency or compelling urgency, procured and served a search warrant
before attempting to intitiate the rectal cavity examination.
Extreme internal body searches, especially forcible, intrusive rectal cavity
invasions, such as occurred in Huguez, if necessary or desired at border crossing,
perhaps should be authorized only upon issuance of search warrants under




Requiring a search warrant would place the burden on the more
impartial judicial officer, either the United States Commissioner or
a judge. The result would be an inconvenience to all parties who
must participate in securing a warrant for a body cavity search, but
such inconvenience is to be balanced against indiscriminate body
cavity searches. The dignity of the human person may be preserved
with this additional safeguard against violation. Until this devel-
opment occurs, the following warrantless types of searches have
been upheld: (1) strip searches5 6 (2) searches of the stomach," (3)
rectal probes, 8 and (4) vaginal searches. 9
The problem presented to the judiciary in adapting existing
law to the border situation, especially in the area of intrusive body
searches, is best illustrated by Blefare v. United States. Previously
in Rochin v. California,61 the Supreme Court held that the use of a
stomach tube, against the will of a party, to extract contraband
from the stomach violated the fourth amendment. The
condemnation of extraction of evidence from the stomach would
appear to be clearly applicable to the Blefare facts, which involved
the forcing of a tube through the party's nose and into his stomach
so that an emetic could be administered. The Blefare court was able
to distinguish Rochin in that the latter did not involve a border
search.62 In holding the search valid, the court recognized the
56. Witt v. United States, 287 F.2d at 389.
57. E.g., Blefare v. United States, 362 F.2d 870 (emetic); Lane v. United States, 321
F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 936 (1964) (emetic); Barrera v. United
States, 276 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1960) (use of emetic); King v. United States, 258 F.2d 754 (5th
Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 939 (1959) (Epsom salt used as an emetic). But see United
States v. Willis, 85 F. Supp. 745 (S.D. Cal. 1949). Willis held use of a stomach pump to be
defective under the fourth amendment. It is questionable, in view of the developments in this
area, if Willis is of any value as authority today.
58. E.g., Rivas v. United States, 368 F.2d at 703; Denton v. United States, 310 F.2d
129 (9th Cir. 1962) (use of a laxative).; Murgia v. United States, 285 F.2d 14 (9th Cir. 1960),
cert. denied, 366 U.S. 977 (1961); Blackford v. United States, 247 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1957).
See Huguez v. United States, - F.2d _.
59. But see Henderson v. United States, 390 F.2d at 805.
60. 362 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1966).
61. 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
This is conduct that shocks the conscience. Illegally breaking into the privacy of
the petitioner, the struggle to open his mouth and remove what was there, the
forcible extration of his stomach's contents-this course of proceeding by agents
of government to obtain evidence is bound to offend even hardened sensibilities.
They are methods too close to the rack and the screw to permit of constitutional
differentiation.
62. Other factual distinctions tendered by the Blefare court included the wrongful
presence of officers in Rochin and "the entire sequence of events." 362 F.2d at 875-77.
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necessity to avoid constitutional sanction to this particular method
of smuggling contraband. The complexity of the concealment for
smuggling purposes permits a legally valid search to the same
extent. Otherwise, "how are our border guardians to stop such
smuggling? We again are faced with the practical problem: must
the people of the United States permit the wholesale introduction of
narcotic drugs into the United States?"6
II. RE-INTRODUCTION OF CONTRABAND INTO THE UNITED STATES
When an individual departs from the United States for a
contiguous foreign country such as Mexico, and returns into the
United States after a short visit, what must he declare upon entry
into the United States? By statute it is provided that:
Any person importing or bringing merchandise into the United
States from a contiguous country. . . shall immediately report
his arrival to the customs officer at the port of entry or customs
house which shall be nearest to the place at which he shall cross
the boundary line and shall present such merchandise to such
customs officer for inspection.64
Furthermore, it is provided that "all merchandise imported or*
brought in from any contiguous country . . . shall be unladen in
the presence of and be inspected by a customs officer at the first
port of entry at which they shall arrive...
Technically, "merchandise" undoubtedly covers every item
that is brought across the border, including all of the personal
clothing and effects of an individual." Inspection is an "essential
prerequisite of entry of imported goods whether they are dutiable or
not . . ." because "inspection is necessary to determine whether
they are in fact non-dutiable.
' 67
Title 18, United States Code, Section 545 proscribes two
separate, distinct types of importation of merchandise. First,
smuggling or clandestine introduction of merchandise which should
have been invoiced is criminal. 6 The importation of merchandise
63. Rivas v. United States, 368 F.2d at 711.
64. 19 U.S.C. § 1459 (1964).
65. 19 U.S.C. § 1461 (1964).
66. "Merchandise" includes even psittacine birds, or other items which may be subject
to regulation by some governmental agency. Duke v. United States, 255 F.2d 721, 724 (9th
Cir.), cert denied. 357 U.S. 920 (1958).
67. United States v. Claybourn, 180 F. Supp. 448,452 (S.D. Cal. 1960).
68. 19 U.S.C. § 1484 (1964).
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contrary to law, which involves the failure to immediately report to
a customs officer and present the merchandise for inspection, is the
second type of importation made a crime. Of course, both activities
merge when merchandise is concealed at a port of entry. The second
prohibition covers the situation where merchandise may be brought
into the United States during daylight hours at a place other than a
port of entry, for example along a beach or in the desert between
ports of entry. The merchandise is not technically "smuggled"
because it is in plain sight and the importation is not clandestine.
However, failure to take steps to declare the merchandise makes
this importation contrary to law.
In United States v. Claybourn9 it was held that bringing
goods taken from the United States back into this country, upon
return from the foreign contiguous country, cannot amount to
smuggling or clandestine introduction of merchandise." "The
purpose of the statute is to prevent the surreptitious, clandestine or
fraudulent entry of the goods into the United States. If the goods
were already in the United States, taking them out and bringing
them in again would not be the act intended to be prohibited by the
statute."'" The court added in Claybourn that if one were to comply
with the customs laws, it would be difficult to find the requisite
"intent to defraud the United States.' ' 2 Although smuggling is
impossible under these circumstances, the failure to comply with
customs regulations would still present the possibility of criminal
liability. Establishing this violation of the statute would require
proving that the acts were done fraudulently and knowingly. As a
practical matter, proof of this element of specific intent would seem
factually beyond the ability of the prosecution. In Claybourn the
court found the requisite intent lacking.
For the defense, however, proving that goods may have
originally been in the United States is more difficult than would
seem at first. A criminal defendant, faced with a violation of this
statute, must overcome the statutory presumption which reads:
"Proof of defendant's possession of such goods, unless explained to
69. 180 F. Supp. 448 (S.D. Cal. 1960).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 451.
72. Id. at 452. Intent to return merchandise smuggled into the United States to the
foreign country of origin is no defense to a charge of importing merchandise contrary to law.
United States v. McKee, 220 F.2d 266 (2d Cir. 1955).
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the satisfaction of the jury, shall be deemed evidence sufficient to
authorize conviction for violation of this section."" This language
has been interpreted to mean that there is a permissible inference of
illegal importation.74 At the border, this inference is of little
significance because the mere fact that the merchandise is
discovered upon entry into the United States permits a reasonable
inference of illegal importation.
When a casual foreign traveller, as distinct from a commercial
importer, rightfully enters the United States from a foreign
contiguous country, oral inquiry is made as to whether he is
bringing anything from the foreign country. At this point, the party
should technically enumerate all items. Implicitly, such an
enumeration is not expected either by the customs officer or by the
entrant. Each assumes that the inquiry refers to items obtained in
the foreign country and imported into the United States for the first
time by that individual. The oral declaration of items secured in the
foreign country is a simultaneous declaration of items not obtained
in that country. If merchandise is discovered that seems to have
been obtained in the foreign country, proof that the goods
originated in the United states would factually prevent a successful
prosecution for importation contrary to law.
The impossibility of prosecution by federal authorities for
smuggling or taking goods from the United States and then
bringing them back into this country, and the improbability of
prosecution for failing to comply with customs law does not mean
that the possession of illegal merchandise or contraband will go
unpunished. Thus, if marihuana or amphetamine tablets are re-
introduced into the United States and discovered upon that re-
introduction, there is no reason that the matter could not be and
should not be referred to local jurisdictions for purposes of
prosecution. Under such a situation, a criminal defendant is caught
between Charybdis and Scylla." In order to establish his
affirmative defense in the federal case he has to admit to facts
which render a state prosecution virtually indefensible.
73. 18 U.S.C. § 545 (1964).
74. Shore v. United States, 56 F.2d 490 (D.C. Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 285 U.S. 552
(1932).
75. In Greek mythology, these are the whirlpool and rock.
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III. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT AT THE BORDER
A. Importation Statutes
The expanding application of the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination causes re-examination of that principle
insofar as it applies to the border. The privilege can be raised in two
instances. First, there is the issue of whether or not the smuggling
and illegal importation statutes76 contravene the fifth amendment.
The second problem relates to the statutory presumption in each of
these statutes,77 and whether it offends the privilege.
The application of the fifth amendment to the declaration
involved in the importation laws has never received serious
consideration until recently when the argument was rejected. 5 One
facet of this rejection was the argument that the privilege does not
apply to the actual commission of a crime. Further it was reasoned
that:
It would be strange indeed if one could Constitutionally be
required to declare ordinary merchandise at the border and be
punished for failure so to do, if, at the same time, surreptitious
importation of contraband does not have to be declared and a
failure to declare cannot be punished. The importation is not
compelled and the Fifth Amendment privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination does not apply."
In Marchetti v. United States,"0 Grosso v. United States,' and
Haynes v. United States," involving gambling tax statutes, the fifth
76. 18 U.S.C. § 545 (1964) (merchandise); 21 U.S.C. § 174 (1964) (narcotic drug); 21
U.S.C. § 176(a) (1964) (marihuana).
77. The presumption in Title 18 of the United States Code, Section 545 is quoted in text
accompanying note 73 supra. The presumptions in the Title 21 offenses, Sections 174 and
176(a) differing only in the application to the respective contraband, "narcotic drug" and
"marihuana," provide:
Whenever on trial for a violation of this section the defendant is shown to have
or to have had possession . . . . such possession shall be deemed sufficient
evidence to authorize conviction unless the defendant explains the possession to
the satisfaction of the jury.
78. Rule v. United States, 362 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1018
(1967); Haynes v. United States, 339 F.2d 30 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 924
(1965); Ruiz v. United States, 328 F.2d 56 (9th Cir. 1964); Arrizon v. United States, 224 F.
Supp. 26 (S.D. Cal. 1963); Pickett v. United States, 223 F. Supp. 695 (S.D. Cal. 1963),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 939 (1964). See Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U.S. 178 (1925);
United States v. Eramdjian, 155 F. Supp. 914, 927 (S.D. Cal. 1957).
79. Rule v. United States, 362 F.2d at 217.
80. 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
81. 390 U.S. 62 (1968).
82. 390 U.S. 85 (1968).
19691
SAN DIEGO LA W REVIEW
amendment privilege was held to apply to the actual or prospective
commission of an offense. Thus, a portion of the argument
supporting the nonapplicability of the fifth amendment to illegal
importation has been eroded. In spite of these decisions, the statutes
have still been upheld against this attack on appeal 3 and in the trial
court.14 By granting certiorari in Leary v. United States5 the
Supreme Court will consider the issue this fall.
The gambling tax cases, Marchetti, Grosso and Haynes, have
been held factually distinguishable from the illegal importation
situation. 6 In those cases, one could not register to pay the tax
without subjecting himself to criminal liability. In this case,
merchandise can be legally imported, and declaration does not
mean criminal liability. 7 Similarly marihuana can be legally
imported under federal law8 and state law 9. However, narcotic
drugs may pose a more serious problem. While crude opium and
coca leaves can be legally imported,90 heroin falls into a separate
category. It cannot be imported or manufactured in the United
States. 9' Thus the importation of heroin is illegal, and the required
declaration would subject the possessor to criminal penalty.
However, this factor has not caused the narcotic smuggling statute
to be distinguished on this ground when under a fifth amendment
self-incrimination attack.92
B. The Statutory Presumption
The statutory presumption contained in each of the illegal
importation laws also raises issubs of fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination. Each statute provides in essence that
evidence of possession of the contraband is sufficient to authorize
83. Leary v. United States, 383 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1967), rehearing on supplemental
petition, 392 F.2d 220 (1968), cert. granted, 392 U.S. 903 (1968).
84. United States v. Reyes, 280 F. Supp. 267 (S.D. N.Y. 1968).
85. Leary v. United States, 383 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1967), rehearing on supplemental
petition, 392 F.2d 220 (1968), cert. granted, 392 U.S. 903 (1968).
86. Leary v. United States, 392 F.2d at 221.
87. See Pickett v. United States, 223 F. Supp. at 695.
88. 26 U.S.C. §§ 4741-57, 4771-75 (1964).
89. Leary v. United States, 392 F.2d at 221.
90. 21 U.S.C. § 173 (1964); 26 U.S.C. §§ 4701-07,4721-26,4731-36 (1964).
91. Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 1402 (1964); Palermo v. United States 112 F.2d 922, 924 (Ist
Cir. 1940); United States v. Lee Foo Yung, 46 F. Supp. 147, 149 (E.D. N.Y. 1942). See
Pon Wing Quong v. United States, 11I F.2d 751, 756 (9th Cir. 1940).
92. Murray v. United States, No. 22, 340 (9th Cir. 1968).
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conviction unless defendant's possession is satisfactorily explained
to the jury.93 Possession, in this context, is legally defined as
dominion and control plus knowledge. 4 Upon a mere reading of
the statutory presumption, the forceful impact seems to be that the
criminal defendant's right not to take the witness stand is
jeopardized by the law-he is forced to testify.
The statutory presumption has been upheld against a fifth
amendment attack, both on the grounds of due process and the
privilege against self-incrimination.95 The courts have reasoned that
the relationship between the fact proved and the inference to be
drawn from that fact is not so " 'unreasonable as to be a purely
arbitrary mandate.' "96 The compulsion upon the defendant to
testify is nonexistent.
The statute compels nothing. It does no more than to make
possession of the prohibited articleprima facie evidence of guilt.
It leaves the accused entirely free to testify or not as he chooses.
If the accused happens to be the only repository of the facts
necessary to negative the presumption arising from his
possession, that is a misfortune which the statute under review
does not create but which is inherent in the case."
The problem of the statutory language is its "sledge ham-
mer" effect upon the trial jury. The unsophisticated juror is
generally unable to distinguish possession as meaning "dominion
and control" and legal possession, which includes the element of
knowledge of the presence of the substance.98 Skillful argument of
the statutory language can, in effect, seem to shift the burden of
proving his innocence to the defendant and relieve the prosecution
from proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.9 Thus, the language
93. 18 U.S.C. § 545 (1964); 21 U.S.C. §§ 174, 176(a) (1964). When discussing the
language and when citing, no distinction between the statutes will be noted because of the
complete similarity of the three presumptions.
94. See text accompanying note 98 infra.
95. Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U.S. 178 (1925). See e.g., Valenzuela-Hernandez v.
United States, 389 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1968); Thomas v. United States, 372 F.2d 252 (5th Cir.
1967).
96. Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U.S. at 184. See also, e.g., Sanchez v. United
States, 398 F.2d 799 (9th Cir. 1968).
97. Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U.S. at 185. See also, e.g., Morgan v. United
States, 391 F.2d 237 (9th Cir. 1968).
98. United States v. Tijerina, 138 F. Supp. 759, 760 (S.D. Tex. 1956) (where the
convictions were reversed because the facts did not support a showing of knowing possession
by the defendants).
99. In Barone v. United States, 94 F.2d 902, 903 (9th Cir. 1938), the court said that the
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of the presumption has been described as "cryptic,"' 0  and
misleading.'0 '
Actually, the presumption creates inferences'02 in favor of the
United States on all elements of the offense. °0 "Inference" is the
statute "places upon the defendant the burden of proving his innocence, once the government
has established his possession of the incriminating articles." See United States v. Llanes, 374
F.2d 712, 715-16 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 917 (1967).
100. Chavez v. United States, 343 F.2d 85, 87 (9th Cir. 1965).
101. Tomplain v. United States, 42 F.2d 205, 206 (5th Cir. 1930).
102. United States v. Llanes, 374 F.2d at 715. As to the elements of illegal importation
statutes, see Burge v. United States, 342 F.2d 408 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 829
(1965); Robinson v. United States, 263 F.2d 911 (10th Cir. 1959); Kalos v. United States, 9
F.2d 268 (8th Cir. 1925).
103. The statutes provide as follows:
Whoever fraudulently or knowingly imports or brings any narcotic drug
into the United States or any territory under its control or jurisdiction, contrary
to law, or receives, conceals, buys, sells, or in any manner facilitates the
transportation, concealment, or sale of any such narcotic drug after being
imported or brought in knowing the same to have been imported or brought into
the United States contrary to law, or conspires to commit any of such acts in
violation of the laws of the United States, shall be imprisoned not less than five
or more than twenty years and in addition, may be fined not more than $20,000.
For a second or subsequent offense (as determined under section 7237 (c) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954), the offender shall be imprisoned not less than
ten or more than forty years and, in addition, may be fined not more than
$20,000.
Whenever on trial for a violation of this section the defendant is shown to
have or to have had possession of the narcotic drug, such possession shall be
deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction unless the defendant explains
the possession to the satisfaction of the jury.
21 U.S.C. § 174 (1964).
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, whoever, knowingly, with
intent to defraud the United States, imports or brings into the United States
marihuana contrary to law, or smuggles or clandestinely introduces into the
United States marihuana which should have been invoiced, or receives, conceals,
buys, sells, or in any manner facilitates the transportation, concealment, or sale
of such marihuana after being imported or brought in, knowing the same to
have been imported or brought into the United States contrary to law, or
whoever conspires to do any of the foregoing acts, shall be imprisoned not less
than five or more than twenty years and, in addition, may be fined not more
than $20,000. For a second or subsequent offense (as determined under section
7237 (c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954), the offender shall be imprisoned
for not less than ten or more than forty years and, in addition, may be fined not
more than S20,000.
Whenever on trial for a violation of this subjection, the defendant is shown
to have or to have had the marihuana in his possession, such possession shall be
deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction unless the defendant explains
his possession to the satisfaction of the jury.
As used in this section, the term "marihuana" has the meaning given to
such term by section 4761 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
21 U.S.C. § 176(a) (1964).
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preferred term to use in jury instructions rather than the much
more forceful term, "presumption."''0 4 To evoke use of the statutory
language'05 there must be sufficient facts to establish possession on
the part of the accused.'06
In cases away from the border, the statutory language can
generally be used to establish the fact of illegal importation.' 7
However, a denial on the part of the defendant of such knowledge
suffices to rebut that inference.' To affirmatively establish such
knowledge of illegal importation, the prosecution can show actual
knowledge; but if not, the "test is whether there was a conscious
purpose to avoid enlightenment."'0 9 At the border, the language of
the statute is rarely applicable, as importation is never in issue.
Knowledge of the presence of the contraband must be shown to
establish possession in order to invoke the presumption. At the
border, showing knowledge of the presence of the contraband is a
simultaneous showing of knowledge of the illegal importation.
Thus, in a prosecution for an incident occurring at the border, use
of the presumption for its extra-legal effect upon the jury would
seem to be an attempt to increase the possibility of conviction.
If these more meaningful explanations of the nature of the
statutory language to the jury are required by the courts, it "may
somewhat mar the full beauty of . . . [such language] for
prosecutors. But, . . . the impairment is partial only since the
defendant frequently does not take the stand, or makes some other
defense, or may not be believed."" 0 Finally it should be noted that
the fifth amendment challenges of due process and self-
incrimination are again before the Supreme Court of the United
States this fall."'
104. Verdugo v. United States, 402 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1968). In Verdugo "explicit
reference to the statute itself in the charge" was discouraged as the "poorer practice." For a
discussion of the relationship of a "presumption" to an "inference," see Barfield v. United
States, where the conviction was reversed because of the use of the term "presumption"
rather than "permissible inference" in a prosecution for interstate transportation of a stolen
motor vehicle. 229 F.2d 936, 940-41 (5th Cir. 1956).
105. See material cited note 103 supra.
106. Brumbelow v. United States, 323 F.2d 703 (10th Cir. 1963) (insufficient factual
showing of possession); United States v. Tijerina, 138 F. Supp. at 759 (insufficient factual
showing of possession). See Tomplain v. United States, 42 F.2d at 206.
107. United States v. Llanes, 374 F.2d at 715.
108. Id. A mere denial will suffice only where the defendant has not "purposely
avoided enlightenment." See also, Chavez v. United States, 343 F.2d at 87; Griego v. United
States, 298 F.2d 845 (10th Cir. 1962).
109. Griego v. United States, 298 F.2d at 849.
110. United States v. Llanes, 374 F.2d at 716.
111. Leary v. United States, 383 F.2d at 85 1.
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IV. GOVERNMENTAL IMPORTATION
Under some circumstances agents of governmental units will
be aware in advance that contraband is about to be imported into
the United States. Arrangements are then made to insure that entry
into the United States proceeds without impediment. The most
common situation where this type of importation might occur is
when the driver of a vehicle, which contains concealed contraband,
is a government informant or "special employee" of the
government. To illustrate what might factually happen in such a
case, assume that the informer arrives at the port of entry. He
identifies himself, and in response to the inquiry as to what he is
bringing into the United States, he states that he is importing
"thirty-five pounds of marihuana." He then explains to the
inspector that his arrival was expected. A check of the veracity of
the allegation results in allowing the car to proceed to its inland
destination. At that location a different individual assumes
dominion and control of the vehicle. That person is charged with
(I) smuggling marihuana which should have been invoiced, (2)
importing marihuana contrary to law, and (3) concealing and
facilitating the transportation and concealment of illegally
imported marihuana.
' 2
Has a crime been committed? The advance information and
knowledge on the part of the federal officials charged with the
enforcement of customs laws seems to negate any possibility that
the marihuana was smuggled or clandestinely introduced into the
United States. The fact that the informant declares the mari-
huana, and is permitted to enter the United States appears to
raise a serious question of whether customs laws and regulations
were violated. That apparent criminal conduct may be immune
from prosecution intrigues the imagination. Appellants in Haynes
v. United States"3 argued that the marihuana was not illegally
imported because it is not an offense for a government agent to
bring marihuana into the United States; and further that since,
under federal law, government agents are not required to pay any
tax on marihuana, there was no violation of either the smuggling
statute or the transferee statute."14 However, without citation of
112. The identity of the person who illegally imported the contraband need not be
alleged. Huizar v. United States, 339 F.2d 173, 175 (5th Cir. 1964), cerl. denied, 380 U.S.
959 (1965).
113. 319 F.2d 620 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 885 (1963).
114. 26 U.S.C. § 4744 (1964).
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authority, the court stated: "Though when looked at from a com-
pletely technical point, these arguments may seem to have validity,
this is only seeming because . . . [other facts constituted evidence
of guilt].""' 5 Or:
As we see it, though the defendants in this argument pile
Pelion on Ossa"6 to deprive the case of legal substance by
making it appear that there was no violation by the defendants
but by the government itself, the facts, looked at in their reality
and sequence, show that the commission of the offenses, as to
which the appellants were convicted, is clearly and thoroughly
established." 7
Guerra v. United States,"' concerned a civil suit by the
government to foreclose a tax lien on illegally transferred
marihuana. The marihuana had been brought into the United
States from Juarez, Chihuahua, Republic of Mexico, while the
vehicle was being followed by customs officials in Mexico. There is
no suggestion that the driver had alerted customs officials that he
would be entering the United States. What transpired at the border
is unreported, but other facts tend to support a failure to declare the
presence of the marihuana to the inspectors at the line. The driver
was arrested in New Mexico, and cooperated in delivering the
marihuana to Guerra in Pueblo, Colorado. The court stated:
Nor can we accept appellant's claim that the role played by
government officials makes this transaction something other
than a transfer. The officers neither devised nor directed the
transportation scheme. In substance, what they did was not to
interrupt it. They did no more than assist the carrying out of a
mission that had been planned before they became aware of it.
Defendant, meanwhile, performed every act necessary to bring
the marihuana into his possession." 9
Once again there is no citation of authority in this discussion.
In Juvera v. United States2' the defendant was charged with
smuggling and concealing heroin. The informer had driven the
115. 319 F.2d 620, 622.
116. In Greek mythology, the Titans, in their futile attempt to reach and attack the
gods in heaven, piled Ossa, a mountain in eastern Greece, on Pelion, another mountain, and
both on Olympus.
117. Haynes v. United States, 319 F.2d at 622.
118. 371 F.2d 584 (10th Cir. 1966).
119. Id. at 586 (emphasis added).
120. 378 F.2d 433 (9th Cir. 1967).
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load into the United States, and had informed customs officials
of the impending importation. The court argued as follows:
Other contentions are made here which are too frivolous to
be worthy of comment. Thus it is asserted that because
Miramontes, the government informer, was the person who
actually carried the narcotics across the boundary, no crime was
committed here. Nothing is more common than to have
convictions of unlawful sales upheld where the purchaser is a
government agent. It would be equally absurd to argue that in
such cases no crime was committed.
2
1
For this statement the court cited Haynes v. United States2 1
and added in the footnote:
The proof of importation by the defendant is not based
upon any claim of misconduct by Miramontes. What
Miramontes did here was to transport the automobile as a
container of narcotics in the same manner in which an express
company might have transported a box of narcotics as a
common carrier. The defendants here are being prosecuted for
their own wrongful acts and intent and not as aiders or abettors
of some government agent.'23
The lack of citation of authority, the absence of reference to
legislative intent, and the absence of intellectually compelling
reasoning on this issue by the courts reflect a simplistic reaction to
the facts: a person should not be able to avoid criminal liability
because of a fortuitous circumstance over which he had no control
and which was unexpected by him. The undeniable existence of
criminal intent and planning compelled the court to find the
appellant guilty without facing the issue of whether in fact the
criminal act alleged had taken place.
Haynes reflects a complete boot-strap rationale. The court
concluded guilt without discussing the appellant's allegation that
the critical fact of illegal importation was lacking. This superficial
reasoning is set forth in spite of the recognition given to the obvious
tenability of appellant's position. Guerra is factually
distinguishable because the importation was clearly contrary to
law, and is, on that basis, not applicable. Juvera analogizes
121. Id. at 437.
122. 319 F.2d 620 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 885 (1963).
123. Juvera v. United States, 378 F.2d at 437, nA.
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erroneously to an undercover sale, in which the seller has the
requisite intent and does the necessary act.
Of course, the theoretical considerations may present only an
illusory problem. It would seem that the prosecution could avoid
the issue presented by the informer's introduction of contraband
into this country by charging a conspiracy to commit the
prohibited act. The narcotics and marihuana smuggling statutes
contain their own proscriptions against conspiring to commit any
of the other conduct made criminal by the statute.14 The general
federal conspiracy statute"5 applies to conspiring to violate the
merchandise smuggling statute. With respect to Title 21
conspiracies, it is not necessary to allege an overt act.
2 6
Furthermore, it is not even necessary to prove that any of the acts
took place within the United States.'2 Thus, the acts of conspiring
and confederating to smuggle marihuana or narcotics would not be
dependent upon or in any manner affected by the fact that the
government was responsible for the importation of the contraband.
Even if it were necessary to find an overt act committed within the
jurisdiction of the prosecuting district, the act of introducing the
contraband into the United States could provide the requisite overt
act. An overt act in any conspiracy need not be criminal in
nature;' 8 the only requirement is that the act be in furtherance of
the conspiracy.2 9 Importing the contraband, even if not "contrary
to law," would suffice to satisfy the conspiracy element of an overt
act.
If a conspiracy is not charged, there should be better-reasoned
judicial justification to uphold a determination that the conduct of
the parties is criminal in spite of the fact that the government is
responsible for the presence of the contraband in this country. On
the surface it would seem that legislative intent could provide a
meaningful tool to hue the same result. Obviously the
comprehensive' attack by Congress on smuggling and illegal
importation provides a basis for arguing that the statute is violated
even though an informer brings the contraband into the country.
124. 21 U.S.C. §§ 174, 176(a) (1964).
125. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1964).
126. Ewing v. United States, 386 F.2d 10, 15 (9th Cir. 1967); Leyvas v. United States,
371 F.2d 714, 717 n.4 (9th Cir. 1967).
127. See Brulay v. United States, 383 F.2d 345, 350 (9th Cir. 1967).
128. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 334 (1957).
129 Id.
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Alternatively, it could be argued that the importation is still
contrary to law with respect to those who are not present at the
border when the importation occurs. Those parties are of the
opinion and have a good faith belief that the importation will be
contrary to law. This state of mind arguably satisfies the
allegations of smuggling or illegal importation. However, the act
requirement can never be satisfied by a belief in a fact, if there is no
act.
The alarming aspect of this discussion is that a failure to
provide an intellectually satisfying rationale to explain why
criminality is not avoided in the informer-importation situation
opens the door for the equally simplistic acceptance of the
superficial logic that no criminal act has taken place. Impetus to
the appeal of this logic will undoubtedly result from Judge Ely's
reaction to the situation in his dissent in Lannom v. United
States.' There appellant was charged with transporting and
concealing marihuana which he knew to have been illegally
imported. Judge Ely stated as follows:
The prosecution should have been required to prove, at the
very least, that the government itself did not, through one of its
own agents, accomplish the importation. If the government
itself imported the marihuana, it is indeed anomalous that it is
now permitted to say that the accused "knew" that the sub-
stance had been imported "illegally, contrary to law."''
V. THE INFORMER AT THE BORDER
A. Identity of the Informer
In the border situation, the problem of revealing the identity of
informers may arise. In the typical situation, the informer will be a
person who observes a vehicle or persons located in or about a
known narcotics dealer's place of business. The informer usually
does no more than observe and relay the description of the person
or vehicle to the officials at the border.' 32
With respect to informers, the main issue is one of disclosure.
The Supreme Court has held in Roviaro v. United States'33 that
130. 381 F.2d 858 (9th Cir. 1967).
131. Id. at 862-63.
132. Rodriguez-Gonzalez v. United States, 378 F.2d 256, 257 (9th Cir. 1967);
Alexander v. United States, 362 F.2d 379, 381 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 977 (1966).
133. 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
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disclosure is mandatory where the informer is an active participant
in the crime, or where the informer might be of assistance in the
defense of the case. If disclosure is ordered, and the government
chooses still to refuse to identify the informer, the courtthen may
dismiss the case. In Roviaro when the narcotics were being
transferred the informer was in the car with the accused and the
narcotics agent was concealed in the trunk of the vehicle. Other
than those three parties, no one else was involved in the transaction.
The Court in Roviaro held that the identity of the informer should
have been revealed under those circumstances. In addition, the
decision purported to render some authoritative guidelines to assist
in determining the propriety of requiring disclosure of the
informer's identity. The Court stated:
We believe that no fixed rule with respect to disclosure is
justifiable. The problem is one that calls for balancing the public
interest in protecting the flow of information against the
individual's right to prepare his defense. Whether a proper
balance renders nondisclosure erroneous must depend on the
particular circumstances of each case, taking into consideration
the crime charged, the possible defenses, the possible
significance of the informer's testimony, and other relevant
factors.'34
It is difficult to imagine that the type of informer usually
present in a border case will ever begin to approach the Roviaro
situation.'35 Invariably, however, if there is the slightest suggestion
or inkling that an informer is involved, defense counsel will move to
have the identity of the informer disclosed.'36 Almost as frequently
the prosecution will seek to avoid being compelled to make the
disclosure. The motion is made with the hope that a governmental
134. Id. at 62.
135. The informer's "tip" was only as to the identity of the automobile said
to be carrying, narcotics. Thiere was no information a's to the identity of the
occupants of the car, other than that they were "two negro males." Moreover,
the informant gave his information from the Mexican side of the border and at
a time before the offense with which appellant was charged could have been
committed in. . . [the United States].
Alexander v. United States, 362 F.2d at 38 1.
From these facts the court found that "the informant was admittedly neither a participant in,
nor a witness to, the crime charged in the indictment, and of which appellant stands
convicted." Id. at 383. The motion to reveal the informer was appropriately denied.
136. "It seems fair to state, as the government charges, this seeking of a name appears
to be merely 'a shot in the dark.'" Hurst v. United States, 344 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1965). See
Jones v. United States, 326 F.2d 124 (9th Cir. 1963).
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refusal to disclose the identity of the informer, after the
identification is ordered, will result in a dismissal of the case.
B. Procedure On Motion To Reveal The Informer
The procedure by which the determination is made involves an
evidentiary hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury and
appropriately prior to the trial of the case. 3 This type of motion
and a motion to suppress physical evidence under Rule 41 (e) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure are similar. Presumably the
developments regarding a motion to suppress would apply to a
motion to reveal the identity of the informer. Thus, the prohibition
against use at the time of trial of evidence, given by the accused at
the time of hearing on the motion to suppress,' would seem to
apply in the informer hearing motion. 39
At the hearing on the motion to reveal the identity of the
informer, the burden is on the defense to go forward and present
evidence in order to fit within the Roviaro formula. What evidence
can the accused present? Quite often, the accused believes that the
factual basis can be established -through the testimony of the
governmental agent to whom the information was given.'40 To
establish the truth of the matter stated, defense counsel questions
the substance of the informer's statements. It is obvious that such
inquiries elicit hearsay responses. Are they admissible under any
exception to the rule? Since no exception to the hearsay rule read-
ily applies, it is submitted that the evidence should not be admissi-
ble.
Is the defendant disabled from continuing with his motion?
Obviously not. The accused can take the stand and present the
necessary evidence to require disclosure of the identity of the
informer. The defense risks nothing because any evidence rendered
137. King v. United States, 348 F.2d 814 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 926 (1965).
138. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377(1968).
139. Id. at 393-94. The Court's reasoning seems as applicable to the motion to reveal
the informer as to a motion to suppress.
A defendant is "compelled" to testify in support of a motion to suppress only in
the sense that if he refrains from testifying he will have to forgo a benefit, and
testimony is not always involuntary as a matter of law simply because it is given
to obtain a benefit. However, the assumption which underlies this reasoning is
that the defendant has a choice: he may refuse to testify and give up the benefit.
When this assumption is applied to a situation in which the "benefit" to be
gained is that afforded by another provision of the Bill of Rights, an undeniable
tension is created.
140. Ruiz v. United States, 380 F.2d 17 (9th Cir. 1967).
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at that time could not be used by the prosecution in its case in
chief. 4 However, as a practical matter, if defendant did take the
witness stand and testify in a manner which would shift the burden
to the prosecution on the motion, he might effectively be barring his
ability to testify at the trial. To establish his right to have the
informer identified, the defendant may be forced to incriminate
himself. Evidence incriminating to the defendant at the time of the
motion almost assures that the accused will exercise his privilege
not to testify at trial. For this reason, testimony offered at the time
of trial, which is contradictory to that given at the time of the
motion, might subject the defendant to a possible perjury charge.
Of course, the defense could call other witnesses to make the
necessary showing. However, the evidence presented often has been
found insufficient; denials of the motion to reveal the informer have
not been held error on appeal in a border situation.' 2 In spite of the
following showings by the defense, the court has refused to compel
the prosecution to reveal the informer's identity: (1) a Mexican,
with whom defendant had an altercation, allegedly planted the
heroin in defendant's cigarette package; 43 (2) an informer allegedly
planted marihuana in the locked rear compartment of defendant's
vehicle in order to collect the reward;4 4 and (3) heroin was allegedly
placed in a dustpan under defendant's car by a named individual
who allegedly had a violent dislike for defendant.
45
It is not unusual for a criminal defendant to actually be
acquainted with the party who turns out to be the informer or
"special employee" of the government. If the informer is a
participant in the case, the issue turns from disclosure to one of
calling the informer as a percipient witness to the facts. In the
border situation, the informer is often a Mexican, over whom the
141. See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. at 377 (1968).
142. Encinas-Sierras v. United States, 401 F.2d 228 (9th Cir. 1968); Ruiz v.
United States, 380 F.2d at 17; Alexander v. United States, 362 F.2d at 379; Hammond v.
United States, 356 F.2d 931 (9th Cir. 1966); Cook v. United States, 354 F.2d 529, 531 (9th
Cir. 1965); King v. United States, 348 F.2d at 814. Cf. Miller v. United States, 273 F.2d 279
(5th Cir. 1959). But see Lopez-Hernandez v. United States, 394 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1968). In
Lopez-Hernandez, although the incidents occurred at the border, the informant participated
in a sale of heroin to a federal undercover agent. The rerdsal to disclose the informant's
identity, on the basis of materiality was held to be prejudicial error. The "sale" case parallels
the Roviaro facts, regardless of where the sale occurs. The fact that this purchase occurred at
the border is of no significance.
143. Powell v. United States, 374 F.2d 386 (9th Cir. 1967).
144. Jones v. United States, 326 F.2d at 124.
145. See Baronev. United States, 94 F.2d 902 (9th Cir. 1938).
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government has no jurisdictional power. In spite of this lack of
jurisdiction, the government may be able to produce the informant
to testify with a reasonable effort. However, presently, there is "no
rule that the government is under any general obligation to produce
an informer."' 6 Moreover, the government cannot be held
responsible if the informer either refuses or is not available to take
the witness stand.'47 If the record shows a good faith effort by the
prosecution to produce such a witness, even if the effort is not
productive, there is no error.'48
If the informer is available to be called, failure of the
government to insure his appearance in court is not error;
defendant can subpoena the witness.'49 A continuance might be
appropriate'50 to produce the witness; a denial of the same could be
error.
5'
Although the general balancing with respect to requiring
disclosure deals with the "public's interest in stopping wrongdoing
. . . and the individual's right to prepare his defense,"'5 2 the
existence of a "snitch" in a border incident compels a close
examination of the informer's role. Physical well-being of the
informer is a paramount consideration. "[D]isclosure of an
informant's name, particularly in a border-crossing case involving
narcotics, can have grave consequences. . . ."'I Furthermore,
disclosure of the informer to the accused "as the one responsible for
his arrest would serve to encourage the criminal to wreak his
vengeance on the informer."' 5 4 This possible consequence is to be
measured against the "inherently dangerous procedure"' 55 of
employing persons who are eager "to produce as many accused as
possible at the risk of trapping not merely an unwary criminal but
sometimes an unwary innocent as well."' 56
The difficulties presented to defense in the area of ascertaining
the identity of the informer in the border situation are illustrated in
146. Velarde-Villarreal v. United States, 354 F.2d 9, 12 (9th Cir. 1965).
147. Id. at 12-13.
148. Id. at 13; Tapia-Corona v. United States, 369 F.2d 366 (9th Cir. 1966).
149. Alverez v. United States, 282 F.2d 435,439 (9th Cir. 1960).
150. United States v. Cimino, 321 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1963).
151. United States v. White, 324 F.2d 814 (2d Cir. 1963).
152. Hurst v. United States, 344 F.2d at 327.
153. Id.
154. Powell v. United States, 374 F.2d at 387.




Lannom v. United States.'57 At the trial, the customs agent to
whom the information had been given was called by the defense.
The information related by the informer to the customs agent was
the subject of testimony. Since the government failed to raise the
hearsay objection, the admissibility of the evidence on these
grounds was not in issue. The informer had seen the vehicle being
loaded with the marihuana, but the appellant was not present at
that time, nor was the informer present when appellant was
arrested. Although absence of appellant at the moment the
contraband was placed in the vehicle might have bearing on his
knowledge of its presence, the court held that there was not a
sufficient showing that the informant could be of assistance in the
defense of the case. "Mere speculation that the informer might
possibly be of some assistance is not sufficient to overcome the
public interest in the protection of the informer. The claim that the
informer was a participant was merely hopeful thinking.''55 The
problem of making the appropriate showing has also been stated as
follows:
If the informer's relation to the acts leading directly to or
constituting the crime may be assumed from a fertile
imagination of counsel, the government in practically every case
would have to prove affirmatively that the informant had not
done any such likely acts. Having done that, all would be
revealed and the informer privilege, deemed essential for the
public interest, for all practical purposes would be no more.159
Finally, two additional aspects might affect the possible
disclosure of the informer. First, the defendant should proceed
cautiously because the theory of his case may be destroyed if the
information is related to events on the American, as opposed to the
Mexican, side of the border. Pressing the government on the
informant issue may show additional, confirming evidence of a
defendant's criminality. 60 Second, the government might offer a
stipulation conforming to the theoretical considerations of defense
counsel. For example, if the informant merely observed the loading
157. 381 F.2d 858 (9th Cir. 1967).
158. Id. at 861. Appellant also argued that he was-foreclosed from showing that the
informer was a participant in the offense by driving the toad vehicle. The court found that
appellant had not been prevented from reaching this issue, and in fact, in response to his own
question, was told that the informer did not drive the vehicle. Id. at 862.
159. Miller v. United States, 273 F.2d at 281.
160. Powell v. United States, 374 F.2d at 388.
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of the vehicle, and defendant was not present (a fact arguably
favorable to the defense of the case), a stipulation that the informer
would so testify, if called, would seem to serve the purposes of both
the defense and the government. Such a stipulation, received in
evidence, would not weaken the government's case. The absence of
the transporter of the marihuana at the time it is loaded can always
be explained in the context of a sale in Mexico of contraband. The
usual procedure of the Mexican dealer involves loading the
contraband outside the presence of other participants in the
smuggling. Rejection of such an offered stipulation by the defense
militates against a judicial determination requiring disclosure of
the informer's identity.
VI. DETENTION AT THE BORDER-Is THE PERSON "IN
CUSTODY"?
At the time that an individual applies for entry into the United
States, the inspector normally asks one question relating to the
citizenship of the individual. The next question relates to whether or
not any merchandise is being brought into this country. If both
answers are satisfactory, are subsequent questions and responses
admissible at a later trial in spite of the fact that constitutional
warnings per Miranda are not given?'' Arguably any questions
beyond the two initial inquiries may constitute a "focusing" of
criminal liability, 2 and thus an implicit restriction on one's
freedom in a significant way'63 which should be attended by
Miranda warnings. Quite frequently, the responses to these
questions prove incriminating. The questions might relate to the
ownership of the vehicle or the whereabouts of the travellers in the
foreign country. Later, after appropriate Miranda warnings are
given, these same questions may be answered in a different
manner. The inconsistent responses always require some acceptable
explanation by the defendant. The difficulty in tendering a
reasonable explanation always places the defendant in a less
favorable light.
161. No attempt will be made in this article to resolve the philosophical theories of
government presented by Congressional passage of Title I1, Omnibus Crime Control Bill,
which purports to overrule Miranda. Until that conflict is resolved, this author will proceed
to discuss this issue insofar as Miranda may apply.
162. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478,490 (1964).
163. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,444 (1966).
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One argument for admitting the statements, without having
complied with Miranda is the absence of "in custody" detention as
required by that decision. Miranda looks to the "in custody"
situation because of the coercive atmosphere that is provided by
that circumstance. However, Miranda also states that the privilege
against self-incrimination attaches where an individual is deprived
of freedom of action in any significant way.'64 Once the right to en-
ter the country is established, any further detention certainly falls
within the category of a deprivation of freedom of action in a
significant way. It is quite obvious that the failure to respond to a
question would result in detention. Equally true is that such
detention probably would qualify as a border search in view of the
lesser standard needed to search. Although the two initial questions
may have been answered satisfactorily, physical nervousness
coupled with the refusal to answer subsequent questions may
constitute "mere suspicion" justifying a search at the border.
Regardless of the consequences of a prolonged customs
detention, it is clear that the international traveller is subjected to
the coercive atmosphere similar to that attendant in the "police
station." The traveller is pressured to respond to the inquiry. To
refuse will generate undesirable consequences-the incriminating
effect of a refusal to answer, as well as a prohibition against
travelling inland.
Thus, it is not surprising to discover judicial approval for
holding the question and response defective under Miranda. In
Deck v. United States,6" the lower court found that the statement
was not within Miranda. However, the mention of it in the opening
statement by governmental counsel was held not to be error.
Although the court did not discuss the issue at all in the appeal, it
did quote the lower court's expression of doubt as to the
inadmissibility of the statement, and the correctness of its ruling.'66
On the other hand, there is authority directly in point holding
Miranda inapplicable to the customs detention situation. In
United States v. Davis67 defendant brought a motion to suppress
statements made to the customs officials. Initially, he was
164. Id. at 444,478.
165. 395 F.2d 89 (9th Cir. 1968).
166. Id. at 92.
167. 259 F. Supp. 496 (D.C. Mass. 1966).
168. Id. at497.
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questioned while "under detention, which did not last over an hour
and a quarter .. ."I' In spite of the fact that he was restricted to
the ship by customs officials, the court found that he had not been
deprived of his freedom of action in a significant way.169 The
following day, before being arrested pursuant to a warrant, he was
asked certain questions to which he gave incriminating responses.
This factual situation was also found to be insufficient as a ground
for invoking the Miranda warnings.1
70
In support of the latter holding, it could be argued that the
inspector is merely performing his duty in determining whether or
not to admit the person into the United States. The additional
questions may be justified in order to satisfy the requirements of
customs laws relating to the declarations and invoicing of
merchandise brought into this country. 7' Ownership of a car and
extent of foreign travel appear to reasonably relate to the issue of
whether there may be merchandise or contraband being introduced
into this country. If there is this justification for the questions on
"customs" grounds, it would seem that Miranda would not
apply. 72
VII. INCLUDED OFFENSES IN IMPORTATION STATUTES
Finally, an analysis of the three smuggling statutes reveals a
close similarity in the language used. Each proscribes smuggling,
illegal importation, concealing and facilitating the transportation
or concealment of contraband. Each one contains basically the
same statutory presumption which arises from a finding of posses-
sion of contraband by a defendant. 7
Conviction under 21 U.S.C. Section 174 carries with it a
mandatory penalty of a minimum five years. Neither probation'
nor parole' 7 is available to one convicted of this offense. Thus a
person so convicted will only receive credit for "good time"'7 in
169. Id. at 498.
170. Id. See also United States v. Jones, 184 F. Supp. 328, 331 (N.D. Cal. 1960).
171. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1459, 1461, 1484, 1485 (1964).
172. See United States v. Burkeen, 350 F.2d 261, (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 966
(1965).
173. See text accompanying note 90 supra.
174. 26 U.S.C. § 7237(d) (1964).
175. Act of Aug. 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-752, § 7, 72 Stat. 845, 847.
176. 18 U.S.C. § 4161 (1964). The statutory construction of "good time" provides:
Each prisoner convicted of an offense against the United States and
confined in a penal or correctional institution for a definite term other than for
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prision, and will do approximately three years and nine months on
the minimum sentence of five years. A maximum of twenty years is
possible. A second conviction carries with it a mandatory penalty
of ten years,' with the same attendant consequences as far as
probation and parole are concerned. Conviction under 21 U.S.C.
Section 176(a) carries the same mandatory penalty of five to twenty
years. However, whereas probation is still precluded, 7' parole is
not. Thus, a person sentenced to the mandatory minimum of five
years could be considered for parole after serving one-third of his
term,' which would be twenty months, less the time earned as
"good time." Conviction under 18 U.S.C. Section 545 carries a
maximum sentence of five years, with no mandatory minimum and
the possibility of probation available.
The possible sentences are set forth to dramatize the issue of
whether the three smuggling statutes overlap in their application. I f
they do, and if a jury is permitted to find a defendant guilty of
Section 545 instead of the violations carrying the mandatory
minimums, the advantages available to a defendant are clear and
desirable.
The vehicle by which the lesser penalty offense could be
invoked is the rule that "[t]he defendant may be found -guilty of an
offense necessarily included in the offense charged ... ."'I' Under
federal law, the nature of a lesser -included offense is not well
defined. There is a sparcity of autfiority dealing with the subject.'
Important considerations in determining an overlapping of offenses
include: (1) whether there is a similarity of elements;'82 and (2)
whether the criminal conduct is defined in varying degrees.' 3 One
test employed is phrased in terms of whether it is impossible to
commit the greater offense without first having committed the
lesser one. 84 It has been said that this test applies to the situation
life, whose record of conduct shows that he has faithfully observed all the rules
and has not been subjected to punishment, shall be entitled to a deduction [and
such deduction is deemed "good time"] ...
177. 26 U.S.C. § 7237(a) (1964).
178. 26 U.S.C. § 7237(d) (1964).
179. 18 U.S.C. § 4202 (1964).
180. FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(c).
181. See 12 Cyclopedia of Federal Procedure, § 48.348 (1965).
182. Giles v. United States, 144 F.2d 860, 861 (9th Cir. 19445. See Berra v. United
States, 351 U.S. 131, 134 (1956) (where the Court found no error in refusing a lesser included
offense instruction where the facts needed to prove both crimes were identical).
183. See United States v. Ciongoli, 358 F.2d 439, 441 (3d Cir. 1966).
184. Salinas v. United States, 277 F.2d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 1960); Giles v. United
States, 144 F.2d at 861.
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where two separate crimes are involved, and not where there is but
one crime with varying degrees depending on the existence of an
aggravating factor."5 Ultimately, it is submitted that the result will
turn upon a judicial determination whether the legislative branch
intended that multi-level punishment attach to certain criminal
conduct.
In the smuggling area the acts made criminal by all three
statutes are identical. The differentiating factor is intent. All
statutes call for acts to be done "knowingly." Knowledge implies a
good faith belief in a fact. Thus, if a driver of a vehicle is told that
the car contains marihuana, and if he believes this assertion to be a
fact, and if the car does have marihuana concealed therein, the man
is guilty of smuggling marihuana even though he may never see,
certainly not touch, smell or in any manner experience any sensory
perception of the contraband. He would be guilty even if he saw the
vegetable matter and believed it to be marihuana, though neither
experience nor a chemical test could establish positvely that the
matter is marihuana.
If a person admits that he knew he was smuggling something,
and that "something" turns out to be merchandise, he is guilty only
under 18 U.S.C. Section 545. If the "something" proves to be
either marihuana or narcotics, he would not be guilty of any Title
21 offense, for to be guilty of those sections, the individual must
know (have a belief) that the "something" is either marihuana or
narcotics. Consider the following hypotheticals:
(1) If an individual actually believes that he is smuggling
sugar, and it turns out to be sugar, he is guilty of 545. If the
substance is chemically shown to be heroin, he is not guilty of
174, because there is no knowledge that the substance is a
narcotic drug. But is he guilty of 545 in that the merchandise
smuggled was heroin?
(2) If he believes that he was smuggling heroin, and it was
heroin, there is no problem. However, if the knowledge relates to
a narcotic drug and the substance is sugar and not heroin, he is
not guilty of 174 because there is no narcotic drug being
imported. But is he guilty of 545?
(3) If the smuggler thinks he has narcotics, but has in fact
marihuana, of what section is he guilty? Not 174 (no act) and
not 176a (no knowledge) but what again about 545?
185. Salinas v. United States, 277 F.2d at 918.
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Only a general interit to smuggle is necessary under 545.
Specific intent to smuggle the specific item is necessary for the
other two offenses.'16 Therefore, the more specific intent exists in
addition to the general intent. Presumably the prosecution could
charge a defendant who is discovered bringing narcotics and
marihuana into the United States with separate counts for
smuggling merchandise, said merchandise being in each count
marihuana and narcotics.' 7 Moreover, two additional counts could
be charged for each substance under Title 21. The jury would be
instructed that if they find that he has merely a gefieral intent to
smuggle something into the United States, he can be found guilty of
the merchandise counts. If they find that he knew the substances
were marihuana and narcotics, they can find him guilty of those
counts.
The problem arises because invariably only the Title 21
offenses are charged. Is it error for a court to refuse to give a "lesser
included" offense instruction dealing with 545? There appears to be
no authority for holding that it is error for a court to refuse to give
such an instruction.
Thus the risk is obviously with the government. Should the
government choose to go to trial on a narcotic smuggling charge,
and should the jury believe that the defendant knew he had
something but did not know that what he had was a narcotic,
defendant would be acquitted on smuggling narcotics and walk out
of the courtroom. Although his intent to smuggle something would
be present, the government would lose the felony conviction.
However, the prosecution may wish to put the jury to the
difficult choice each time. Failing to charge the 545 offense takes
away from the jury the ability to allow sympathy to enter into their
deliberations, and convict of the offense with the lesser penalty.
Although juries are instructed that the matter of punishment is not
within their province, it is suggested that jurors know the
consequences of convicting of the various offenses. The prosecution
may feel that jurors, faced with this difficult task, will do their duty
on the basis of the facts. The prosecution thus achieves the desired
deterrent effect of the greater sentences which would not result if the
186. E.g., Burge v. United States, 342 F.2d 408, 410 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
829 (1965).
187. In United States v. Tijerina, 138 F. Supp. 759 (S.D. Tex. 1956), defendant was
charged with smuggling merchandise (18 U.S.C. § 545), to wit one-quarter pound of
marihuana.
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jury were permitted to convict a defendant of the offense with the
lesser penalty.
There is authority for resolution of this problem, based on
interpretation of legislative intent. In Palermo v. United States '
the court found that the term "merchandise" as used in the
forerunner of 545 did not include "opium" because Congress had
enacted the more specific statute dealing with importation of
opium. 89 Such a distinction provides the short answer in this area.
On the other hand there is authority that later Congressional
treatment of certain items does not foreclose a prosecution under
545.'90 Among the items so judicially treated are LSD,' 9' psittacine
birds, 92 liquor,' 93 and gold. 94 Like opium, however, lottery tickets
are treated differently. 9 Neither dates of enactment'96 nor severeity
of punishment 97 adequately explains different judicial treatment.
The absence of a uniform rationale in these cases leaves the matter
open to argument.
188. 112 F.2d 922, 925 (1st Cir. 1940); United States v. Lee Foo Yung, 46 F. Supp.
147, 149 (E.D. N.Y. 1942).
189. Palermo v. United States, 112 F.2d at 925.
190. E.g., Roseman v. United States, 364 F.2d 18 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 918 (1967).
191. Id. (involving the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act).
192. Duke v. United States, 255 F.2d 721 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 920 (1958)
(involving regulations of the Surgeon General).
193. Callahan v. United States, 53 F.2d 467 (3d Cir. 1931), affd, 285 U.S. 515 (1932)
(involving the National Prohibition Act).
194. United States v. Kushner, 135 F.2d 668 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 212 (1943)
(involving the Gold Reserve Act).
195. United States v. Mueller, 178 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1949).
196. Roseman v. United States, 364 F.2d at 25.
197. Compare Palermo v. United States, 112 F.2d at 922 (more severe punishment and
exclusion of opium from "merchandise") with Roseman v. United States, 364 F.2d 18 (less
severe punishment and no exclusion) with United States v. Mueller, 178 F.2d at 593 (less
severe punishment and exclusion of lottery tickets from "merchandise").
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